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A New Era of Federal Prescribed Fire: Defining
Terminology and Properly Applying the Discretionary
Function Exception
Robert H. Palmer III †
Fire cultivates change. This article illustrates how the use of prescribed fire changed over the last century and how the federal
courts resolved tort claims resulting from prescribed fires. By first
recounting the tumultuous history of prescribed fire and the perplexing terminology used to describe the various categories of
wildland fires, this article then dissects prescribed fire litigation. In
particular, this article explains why recent policy changes have exposed the federal government from behind the discretionary function exception that typically shields the federal government from
tort liability. Thus, this article clarifies confusing terminology and
describes why the discretionary function exception should not bar a
claim for damages resulting from a prescribed fire.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the first time, the Forestry Division hired crews to suppress a
wildfire . . . . A heavy snowfall finally extinguished the fire in the fall,
although a telegram to Washington reported, “through our heroic efforts
the fire has been put out.”
—Charles Deloney (circa 1900) 1

Although humans have always had a relationship with fire, the
relationship experienced dramatic changes in the last century. As society
expanded westward during the early half of the twentieth century, the
human-fire relationship waned to its lowest level. Fire was perceived as a
threat, similar to that of an enemy in war, and the federal government
responded by dispatching the Army to aggressively fight fire. 2 For many
communities in the West, fire was the enemy that initiated its attack with
a flash of lightning and the rumble of thunder. However, after waging a
war against fire for nearly fifty years, the perception of fire slowly
changed as federal land managers and society recognized the detrimental
effects of aggressive fire suppression: it was expensive, it caused
significant environmental damage, and it caused public land to become
more vulnerable to future fires.3
1. JOHN DAUGHERTY, NAT’L PARK SERV., GRAND TETON HISTORIC RESOURCE STUDY (1999),
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/grte2/hrs17.htm (last updated July 24, 2004)
(quoting Charles “Pap” Deloney, who was the first forest supervisor and who sent the telegram circa
1900).
2. The Army was used extensively from 1872 to about 1916 to fight fires on federal land because the various modern fire agencies, like the National Park Service, did not exist yet or did not
have sufficient resources to control fires. HAL K. ROTHMAN, A TEST OF ADVERSITY AND
STRENGTH: WILDLAND FIRE IN THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM 2 (2005), available at
http://www.nps.gov/fire/download/fir_wil_history.pdf.
3. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 120–24; Biodiversity Assocs. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1156–
57 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that fire suppression efforts created unintended consequences: denser
forests and greater fire risks).
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Instead of aggressive fire suppression, the human-fire relationship
changed as society recognized the importance of fire. During the middle
of the twentieth century, the primary federal land agencies—the U.S.
Forest Service, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Land
Management, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs 4—experimented with fire by allowing some fires to burn
naturally and even intentionally igniting other fires. 5 At the same time,
Congress enacted environmental laws to give the federal land agencies
direction regarding how to better manage federal lands. 6 The human-fire
relationship began to evolve.
In the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century, our
relationship with fire—specifically prescribed fire 7—reached a point at
which society accepted that civilization and fire could coexist.8 Society
finally recognized that fire was not only necessary for many species to
survive, but it was also a necessary tool that could improve the health of
public lands and protect communities. At the same time, the federal land
agencies created a unified prescribed fire policy, which enabled more use
of prescribed fire than ever before. 9 Ultimately, the federal land
agencies’ increased use of prescribed fire will minimize wildfire threats
to communities, but that protective benefit has a risk: an increased
likelihood of prescribed fire tort litigation. Because prescribed fires will

4. In this article, the term “federal land agencies” refers only to those five federal agencies that
have wildland fire programs and are represented at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise,
Idaho. Although three other agencies—National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Homeland Security U.S. Fire Administration, and the Department of the Interior’s National
Business Center Aviation Management Directorate—are also affiliated with the National Interagency Fire Center, this article does not directly apply to them because they do not manage federal land.
Additionally, because the National Association of State Foresters is not a federal agency, this article
does not apply to it either. About NIFC, NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR.,
http://www.nifc.gov/aboutNIFC/about_mission.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
5. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 120–24.
6. For example, Congress enacted the Wilderness Act on September 3, 1964, which changed
the fire response in wilderness areas. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 1, 78 Stat. 890 (1964)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2011)); ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at iii. The National Environmental
Policy Act was enacted on January 1, 1970. National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190,
§ 2, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2011)).
7. The term “prescribed fire” is defined in more detail in Part III as a human-caused fire intentionally ignited, with authority, to achieve specific objectives identified in an approved prescribed
fire plan. Unlike a “wildfire,” which is an unplanned fire, a “prescribed fire” is a planned fire. Additionally, the term “wildland fire” refers to both “wildfires” and “prescribed fires.”
8. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 120.
9. Fire Information—Wildland Fire Statistics: Prescribed Fires and Acres by Agency, NAT’L
INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., http://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_prescribed.html (last visited
Mar. 31, 2012) [hereinafter NIFC Fire Statistics] (indicating that national prescribed fire reporting
began in 1998).
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inevitably burn out of control, escape, 10 and burn unintended property,
those resulting damage claims are likely to increase as the federal land
agencies increase the use of prescribed fire.11
Unfortunately, the legal framework used to address prescribed fire
tort litigation is obscured with misleading and conflicting terminology.
As the human-fire relationship changed, the use of prescribed fire waxed
and waned, and the federal land agencies also changed the terminology
used to describe fire, especially prescribed fire. Instead of using
consistent terminology, the federal land agencies described prescribed
fire through a potpourri of terms, which confused the public, the
employees, and the courts. 12 Recently, the federal land agencies
confronted this problem and issued new policies to simplify fire
terminology, which also had the effect of altering fire classification
systems. 13 Fortunately, the new fire terminology and classification
policies should reduce public confusion and simplify the federal
government’s defense during litigation.
In addition to recent fire policy changes, the law governing the
federal government’s liability resulting from a prescribed fire is also
changing. 14 As described in Part IV, the discretionary function exception
to the Federal Tort Claims Act generally barred any prescribed fire
damage claim from even reaching trial. 15 However, recent policy
directives and a Florida district court’s decision in 2010 should curtail
the use of the discretionary function exception in any litigation where a
10. “Escape” is a term of art used to describe an uncontrolled prescribed fire that exceeds the
boundaries of the prescribed fire perimeter.
11. E.g., Michigan v. United States, No. 2:11-CV-00303, 2011 WL 7267049 (W.D. Mich. filed
Aug. 12, 2011) (currently litigating a motion to dismiss based on the discretionary function exception because a U.S. Forest Service prescribed fire escaped and allegedly damaged $85,000 of state
lands). See generally Paul Keller, Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center, Prescribed Fire Escapes:
Are We Learning Anything?, TWO MORE CHAINS, Winter 2012, at 1, available at
http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Two_More_Chains_Winter_2012.pdf (discussing the uptick in
the number of recent prescribed fire escapes and feedback to the current prescribed fire review process).
12. See Memorandum from the NWCG Chair to NWCG Committee Chairs and Geographic
Area Coordinating Group, NWCG#030-2010, at 1 (July 8, 2010), [hereinafter NWCG#030-2010]
available at http://www.nwcg.gov/general/memos/nwcg-030-2010.pdf (describing the additional
guidance for communicating about managing wildland fire in light of changes in policy guidance
and terminology).
13. Id.
14. Jonathan Yoder, Liability, Regulation, and Endogenous Risk: The Incidence and Severity
of Escaped Prescribed Fires in the United States, 51 J.L. & ECON. 297, 320 (2008) (discussing the
effects of different prescribed fire laws and concluding that “empirical analysis provides evidence
that different liability and regulatory rules affect the number and magnitude of escaped prescribed
fires.”).
15. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2011); e.g., Thune v. United States, 872 F.
Supp. 921, 922 (D. Wyo. 1995) (holding the discretionary function exception barred the damage
claim resulting from an escaped prescribed fire).
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federal land agency’s prescribed fire escapes and damages non-federal
property. 16
Part II of this article provides background information describing
how and why the federal land agencies use prescribed fire. Part III
describes how the new fire terminology policy changes have altered the
fire classification schemes and why the new terminology and
classification policy will improve the federal land agencies’ ability to
communicate about fire, specifically prescribed fire. Part IV examines
the prescribed fire jurisprudence in light of recent policy directives.
Finally, Part V concludes by reiterating that federal land agencies need to
embrace the terminology and classification policy, and it also describes
why the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Acts
should not shield the federal land agencies from prescribed fire tort
claims.
II. PRESCRIBED FIRE BACKGROUND
The presence or absence of natural fire within a given habitat is
recognized as one of the ecological factors contributing to the
perpetuation of plants and animals native to that habitat.
—National Park Service (circa 1968)17

A. History of Federal Prescribed Fire
Historically, society and the government considered fire an enemy
and responded by aggressively suppressing any fire. 18 For nearly a
century, from 1872 until the 1960s, a predominately human-centered
value system considered fire a threat to society and community
development. Under that view, any fire was aggressively suppressed
because fire represented an unwanted nuisance to the expanding way of
life. 19 In 1935, the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) had fully embraced
society’s resentment toward fire when the USFS adopted the 10 AM
Policy. 20 The 10 AM Policy directed USFS fire resources to aggressively
16. See discussion infra Part IV; NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., INTERAGENCY
PRESCRIBED FIRE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES GUIDE 19 (July 2008) [hereinafter
2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE], available at http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/RxFire/rxfireguide.pdf
(describing current, as of Mar. 25, 2012, federal prescribed fire policy); Florida v. United States, No.
4:09-CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2010).
17. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 120.
18. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
19. Jan W. van Wagtendonk, Fires in Wilderness in the National Parks, PARK SCIENCE, Feb.
21, 2012, at 20, available at http://www.nature.nps.gov/parkscience/index.cfm?ArticleID=535 (describing that fire suppression dominated fire policy from 1886 to 1967).
20. NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND
FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY 1-1 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE
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suppress all human-caused fires and to contain any fire by 10 a.m. the
next day. 21 The 10 AM Policy became the dominant fire policy for the
United States for the next forty years. During that time, the 10 AM
Policy was incredibly effective: fire durations decreased considerably,
and the amount of acreage burned dropped dramatically. 22 However, the
National Park Service (NPS) did not fully embrace the USFS’s 10 AM
Policy of aggressive fire suppression.
The traditionally human-centered focus shifted towards a more
ecologic-centered focus as scientists, land managers, and politicians
recognized the importance of fire. In the 1960s, the NPS continued to
suppress fires, but the NPS also initiated a new era of fire management:
some lightning-caused fires were allowed to burn, and the use of
prescribed fires became more prevalent. 23 In addition, by the early 1960s
the NPS recognized the need to restore fire within the national parks. At
the same time, Congress enacted the Wilderness Act, which directed
federal land agencies to allow natural processes, like fire, to occur in
wilderness areas. 24 Although the NPS was moving away from fire
suppression in the 1960s, the USFS maintained the 10 AM Policy for
another decade.
Responding to exponentially increasing fire suppression costs and
recognizing the potential value of allowing some fires to burn naturally,
in 1977, the USFS shelved the 10 AM Policy. 25 Like the NPS, the USFS
adopted similar wildland fire policies that shifted from strict fire
suppression to more holistic fire management. 26 After this change, the
federal land agencies increased the use of prescribed fire and allowed

MANAGEMENT POLICY], available at http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/ppm/fpc/archives/fire_policy/h
istory/index.htm.
21. Id.
22. 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY, supra note 20, at 1-6.
23. Gregory H. Aplet, Evolution of Wilderness Fire Policy, INT’L J. WILDERNESS, Apr. 2006,
at 9, available at http://www.wilderness.net/library/documents/IJWApr06_Aplet.pdf.
24. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2011) (Wilderness areas “shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these
areas, the preservation of their wilderness character . . . .”). See generally Sierra Club v. Block, 622
F. Supp. 842, 850 (D. Colo. 1985) (describing the purpose and legislative history of the Wilderness
Act); FIRE MGMT. POLICY REVIEW TEAM, 1988 REPORT ON FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY 54 (Dec.
14, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW], available at http://www.nwcg.go
v/branches/ppm/fpc/archives/fire_policy/mission/1988_fire_mgmt_preview_team_rpt.pdf;
Aplet, supra note 23, at 9.
25. 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY, supra note 20, at 1-1.
26. Id.; see also Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh'g denied
(2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2878 (2009) (stating in 1968 the USFS ended its policy of mandatory
wildfire suppression that began in 1911, and, instead, the USFS replaced it with a selective suppression policy).
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some lightning-caused fires to burn naturally. 27 This “let it burn” policy
came under significant criticism from the public and politicians in
response to the 1988 Greater Yellowstone fires. 28 Although lightning,
not humans, ignited the 1988 Greater Yellowstone fires, many of these
fires were improperly classified as prescribed natural fires because the
fires were allowed to burn naturally. 29 While the classification of fires
has caused turmoil ever since the 1988 Greater Yellowstone fires, the
federal land agencies have continued managing fire, especially
prescribed fire, for multiple benefits.
B. Benefits and Consequences of Prescribed Fire
Prescribed fire is a tool that land managers now use to improve
ecosystems and to reduce wildfire risks to communities. 30 When used for
ecosystem benefit, a prescribed fire burns vulnerable vegetation, releases
nutrients contained in that burned material, and recycles those nutrients
by initiating the ecologic cycle. 31 Some ecosystems, like pine or giant
sequoia dominated forests, cannot regenerate without some type of fire
disturbance that causes the cones to open to initiate the reproduction
cycle. 32 Those species that require fire to release their seeds for
germination have serotinous cones and are located in many ecosystems
across the country. 33 In addition, some animal species, like birds or
squirrels, are also dependent upon post-fire habitat. 34 When prescribed

27. Federico Cheever, The Phantom Menace and the Real Cause: Lessons from Colorado’s
Hayman Fire 2002, 18 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 191–92 (2010) (describing that in 1977 the
USFS allowed more prescribed burning as “[f]ire suppression became fire management.”).
28. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 186; Aplet, supra note 23, at 9; Peter H. Froelicher, Issues of
Liability Surrounding Fire Management in the Greater Yellowstone Area, 27 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 123, 124 (1992) (describing that the Greater Yellowstone fires “stirred a heated debate concerning the proper fire management policy”).
29. 1988 FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW, supra note 24, at 1.
30. NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., NFES 2724, INTERAGENCY STANDARDS FOR FIRE AND
FIRE AVIATION OPERATIONS 17-1 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 REDBOOK], available at
http://www.nifc.gov/PUBLICATIONS/redbook/2012/2012RedBookALL.pdf (PDF page 286) (explaining that hazardous fuels reduction programs, which include prescribed fire, reduce hazardous
fuels and improve the health of the land).
31. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 610 (D.C. Minn. 1973).
32. Id. (stating that jack pine cones will open and allow dispersal of its seeds only if subjected
to the intense heat of a fire); California v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (giant sequoia).
33. George Wuerthner, Fire in the East: Welcoming Back a Native Son, in WILDFIRE: A
CENTURY OF FAILED FOREST POLICY 96 (George Wuerthner ed., 2006).
34. Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005) (black-backed woodpecker); San Juan Citizens Alliance v. Stiles, No. 1:08-CV-00144, 2010 WL 1780816, at *14 (D.
Colo. May 3, 2010) (hairy woodpecker and bluebird); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., No.
1:05-CV-00372, 2006 WL 4109661, at *28 (D. N.M. Aug. 22, 2006) (Albert's squirrel).
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fire is used for ecosystem benefits the fires tend to be large, on the order
of hundreds to thousands of acres. 35
In addition to ecosystem restoration, land managers also use
prescribed fire in conjunction with other fuel treatments to reduce the
risks associated with wildfires. Any burnable material, like dry brush, is
considered a fuel. 36 Additionally, a hazardous fuel consists of readily
combustible materials that are arranged in a way that makes fire control
difficult and likely causes undesired consequences if burned.37 For
example, highly combustible dense brush, like chaparral, adjacent to a
house would be considered a hazardous fuel because once the chaparral
ignites the resulting fire would likely threaten the house.38 The physical
act of fuel removal is called a fuel treatment or a hazard fuel reduction
project. 39
Land managers use fuel treatments and prescribed fire to protect
people, communities, and ecosystems from subsequent wildfires. 40
Because prescribed fires consume the same fuel necessary to sustain a
wildfire, an area previously burned by a prescribed fire has less fuel
available. Thus, any subsequent fire burns at a lower intensity, and lower
intensity fires are easier to manage than higher intensity fires.41
Therefore, when prescribed fire is used to reduce the risk of subsequent
wildfires, the prescribed fire also tends to be of a lower intensity and
smaller size than a prescribed fire used for ecosystem benefit. Sometimes
35. E.g., Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921, 922 (D. Wyo. 1995) (conducting a 3,000acre fire to improve elk habitat).
36. NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., GLOSSARY OF WILDLAND FIRE TERMINOLOGY
PMS 205, at 88 (May 2011) [hereinafter GLOSSARY], available at http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/g
lossary/pms205.pdf (defining “fuel” as “[a]ny combustible material, especially petroleum-based
products and wildland fuels”).
37. GLOSSARY, supra note 36, at 95 (defining “hazard fuel” as “[a] fuel complex defined by
kind, arrangement, volume, condition, and location that presents a threat of ignition and resistance to
control”).
38. See, e.g., POWAY CAL. MUN. CODE § 8.76.010 (2011), available at http://www.codepublis
hing.com/ca/poway/html/poway08/poway0876.html (describing that removal of highly flammable
chaparral vegetation reduces the risk of wildfire to a structure by creating defensible space); Defensible Space, CITY OF POWAY (June 25, 2010), http://www.poway.org/Index.aspx?page=455 (describing the City of Poway’s defensible space program).
39. Glossary of Terms, FORESTS & RANGELANDS (May 5, 2011), http://www.forestsandrangel
ands.gov/resources/glossary/h.shtml (defining “hazard fuel reduction”).
40. 2012 REDBOOK, supra note 30 (describing that hazardous fuels reduction programs, which
include prescribed fire, reduce hazardous fuels and improve the health of the land); W. Watersheds
Project v. Lane, No. 1:07-CV-0394, 2007 WL 2815039, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 25, 2007) (describing
the Department of Interior’s and the Department of Agriculture’s creation of a hazard fuel categorical exclusions in response to the Healthy Forest Initiative in 68 Fed. Reg. 33,814 (June 5, 2003).
41. See NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., NFES 0065, FIRELINE HANDBOOK 91–94
(2004), available at http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/410-1/410-1.pdf (PDF pages 95–98) (describing that at low intensities direct attack tactics can be used, but at higher intensities indirect attack
tactics must be used).
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a prescribed fire can be as small as a campfire to burn fuel accumulated
as a result of a fuel treatment. 42
The use of prescribed fire, however, can also impair individuals and
the environment. Like any fire, prescribed fires emit smoke, and smoke
affects air quality. 43 Although wildfire smoke may contribute to climate
change, the increased use of prescribed fire, as opposed to higher
intensity wildfires, may actually mitigate the rate of climate change. 44
Moreover, prescribed fires occasionally burn unintended property and
occasionally affect aesthetic values because prescribed fire is inherently
subject to many uncontrollable environmental factors—fuel
characteristics, wind gusts, changes in wind direction, cloud movement
and formation, and rapid changes in relative humidity. 45 Thus,
environmental factors can alter the use of prescribed fire.
Prescribed fire projects conducted by the federal land agencies,
most notably those of the USFS, have also been challenged in court
because the federal land agency allegedly did not properly consider the
various interests or effects of a proposed project. 46 Normally, a
prescribed fire project is developed pursuant to a general land
management plan or is associated with a broader fuel reduction plan, and
those umbrella plans can generate significant litigation.47 For example, in
the mid-2000s, environmental interest groups litigated numerous
commercial timber harvesting projects, which included prescribed fire
treatments, for allegedly failing to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 48 Specifically, in Sierra Club v.
42. Sierra Nevada Forest Prot. Campaign v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 04-CV-2023, 2005 WL
1366507, at *15 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2005) (describing the relationship between prescribed fire and
other fuel treatments); Whites Creek Pile Burning Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest, U.S. FOREST
SERV. (2007), http://www.fs.fed.us/r4/fire/hfr/2007/whitescreek_1.shtml (describing campfire sized
prescribed fires to reduce hazardous fuel loading around a housing development).
43. E.g., Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing that prescribed fire and logging have potential impacts on air, soil, water quality, wildlife, and forest resources).
44. Christine Wiedinmyer & Matthew D. Hurteau, Prescribed Fire as a Means of Reducing
Forest Carbon Emissions in the Western United States, 44 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1926 (2010) (describing the relative benefits of prescribed fire as compared to wildfire and the effects on climate
change).
45. E.g., Robinson v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (personal injury
and property damage claim); Anderson v. United States, 55 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (property
damage claim).
46. E.g., Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (involving the
USFS and alleging National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and National Forest Management
Act violations).
47. E.g., Wildwest Inst. v. Bull, 547 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (involving the USFS and alleging NEPA, National Forest Management Act, and Healthy Forests Restoration Act violations).
48. E.g., Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding the
USFS did not satisfy the "hard look" test required of NEPA for the 2002 Fuel categorical exclusion).
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Bosworth, the Sierra Club challenged a USFS categorical exclusion to
NEPA that excluded the following projects from the NEPA analysis: all
fuel reduction projects up to 1000 acres and prescribed fire projects up to
4500 acres on all national forests. 49 In granting a preliminary injunction,
the court agreed with the Sierra Club and concluded the USFS failed to
demonstrate that it made a reasoned decision based on all the competing
factors. 50
Although legal challenges to hazard fuel projects usually originate
from environmental interest groups, a timber harvest interest group also
challenged the USFS for not appropriately balancing timber production,
wildfire risk, and recreation interests.51 In California Forestry Ass'n v.
Bosworth, the district court granted the USFS summary judgment on all
challenges except the NEPA claim, which it granted summary judgment
in favor of the timber interest group because the USFS failed to consider
all the reasonable alternatives. 52
Finally, the use of prescribed fire has also been challenged for
adversely impacting vulnerable populations of specific species.53 Even
after numerous legal challenges, the federal land agencies have actually
increased the use of prescribed fire.
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Figure 1. Federal Prescribed Fire Trends, 1988 to 2011.

54

49. Id. at 1018.
50. Id. at 1026.
51. Cal. Forestry Ass'n v. Bosworth, No. 2:05-CV-00905, 2008 WL 4370074, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 24, 2008).
52. Id. at *20.
53. W. Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1130 (D. Nev.
2008) (sage grouse).
54. The acronym “Rx” means prescribed fire. The gray bars represent the acres burned by federal prescribed fires, and the black diamonds represent the number of federal prescribed fires con-
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As Figure 1 indicates, the acreage treated with prescribed fire
nearly doubled between 1998 and 2011.55 Specifically, between 1998
and 2003, the acres burned by prescribed fire increased from
approximately 0.8 million acres to 1.86 million acres. Since 2003, the
acreage burned has remained near the 2003 level, but the number of
individual prescribed fires has fluctuated. This increased use of
prescribed fire resulted from the modern realization that the
reintroduction of fire is necessary for the survival of ecosystems and for
community protection.56 However, as the use of prescribed fire
increased, the federal agencies struggled to use consistent terminology to
discuss and differentiate prescribed fire from wildfire.
III. THE NEED FOR CONSISTENT TERMINOLOGY
Sometimes it takes a human generation for the public’s collective mind
to change on an issue.
—Andy Kerr (circa 2006) 57

In the 1960s and 1970s, as the federal land agencies transitioned
from fire suppression to fire management classifying fires became
important. The federal land agencies classified fires into two categories:
a prescribed fire or a wildfire.58 That initial classification determined
what type of response was appropriate. 59 For example, if a land manager
classified the reported fire as a wildfire, then firefighters suppressed it.
Alternatively, if the reported fire was actually a prescribed fire and still
within the purview of the prescribed fire plan, the federal land agency
managed the prescribed fire pursuant to that prescribed fire plan.
However, if the reported fire was not a prescribed fire and if the land
manager decided to not suppress the fire for ecologic or fuel reduction
reasons, the fire did not fit into either of the wildfire or prescribed fire
categories. Sometimes land managers called that type of fire “wildland
fire use,” “fire use,” “prescribed natural fire,” “natural prescribed fire,”

ducted. NIFC Fire Statistics, supra note 9 (describing that national prescribed fire reporting began in
1998, and thus, national prescribed fire data that occurred before 1998 is not available); 1988 FIRE
MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW, supra note 24, at 7 (stating that prescribed fire has been used in
Florida since the 1950s).
55. See NIFC Fire Statistics, supra note 9.
56. DOUGLAS J. MARSHALL ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERV., SYNTHESIS OF KNOWLEDGE OF
HAZARDOUS FUELS MANAGEMENT IN LOBLOLLY PINE FORESTS, at ii (Nov. 2008), available at
http://www.firescience.gov/projects/05-S-04/project/05-S-04_gtr_srs110_synth_loblollypine.pdf.
57. Andy Kerr, The Ultimate Firefight: Changing Hearts and Minds, in WILDFIRE: A
CENTURY OF FAILED FOREST POLICY 277 (George Wuerthner ed., 2006).
58. 1988 FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW, supra note 24, at 5.
59. Id. at 5–9.
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or a “wildfire managed for resource benefit.” 60 Thus, the lack of
consistent terminology is unnecessarily complicating and confusing. 61
The absence of consistent terminology still creates confusion
amongst the public, the courts, and the federal land agencies.62 In 2010,
the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, a group composed of federal
land agency fire leadership with policy making authority, 63 issued a
policy guidance and interpretation memorandum, NWCG#030-2010,
explaining the new fire management and terminology changes:
The most effective way for us to communicate about fire with
the public is to educate ourselves about what to say and how to say
it, and allow each agency and partner to address its own audiences.
....
For both our internal and external audiences, we need to keep
our terminology simple and continue to focus on telling our story
versus getting caught up in explaining the difference between
unplanned and planned ignitions and between wildfires and
prescribed fires. 64

Although the various classification definitions may appear facially
insignificant, the classification provides guidance to whether the federal
land agency’s actions likely fall within the discretionary function
exemption to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 65 As described in Part IV,
infra, if a court finds that the federal land agency acted pursuant to
proper discretion, then any tort claim for money damages terminates
because the court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction.66 For
60. Van Wagtendonk, supra note 19 (describing that fire managers have attempted to curtail
the use of terms like “prescribed natural fire” and “wildland fire use”).
61. Ronald H. Wakimoto, National Fire Management Policy, J. FORESTRY, Oct. 1990, at 22,
25 (appointed to review the national wildland fire policy after the 1988 Greater Yellowstone fires
and concluded that “developing uniform terminology . . . would significantly improve fire management”).
62. NWCG#030-2010, supra note 12.
63. In 1943, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior entered into a Memorandum of Understanding “to provide adequate wildfire management and protection to the lands under their respective jurisdictions.” Then in 1976, those two departments established the NWCG. The purpose of the
NWCG, as a national group, “is to provide national leadership and establish, implement, maintain
and communicate policy, standards, guidelines, and qualifications for wildland fire program management and support the National Incident Management System.” Memorandum of Understanding
for the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (Oct. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.nwcg.gov/general/mou2007.htm.
64. NWCG#030-2010, supra note 62, at 1, 3.
65. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2011); Florida v. United States, No. 4:09CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2010).
66. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 949 F.2d 332, 334 (10th Cir. 1991) (dismissing negligence
suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the National Park Service’s actions in conducting
a rescue fell within the discretionary function exception).

2012]

A New Era of Federal Prescribed Fire

291

example, a federal land agency should succeed in defending a damages
claim resulting from the agency’s response to a wildfire by using the
discretionary function exception, but the discretionary function exception
is not likely to shield a prescribed fire damages claim. 67
Ultimately, the classification of wildland fire has changed as federal
land agencies react to political pressure and as land managers
characterized fire management. 68 Regardless of the various
classifications, wildfires are distinguishable by their cause and by the
management response. The following describes the two interrelated
classification schemes and concludes by reiterating the need to use
consistent terminology.
A. Classification of Fire by Cause
Currently, a federal land agency’s response to a wildland fire is
primarily dictated by the cause of the fire: (1) whether the fire was
intentionally ignited and (2) whether the igniter, the person who actually
started the fire, had authority to ignite the fire.69
A prescribed fire is a human-caused fire intentionally ignited, with
authority, to achieve specific objectives identified in an approved
prescribed fire plan. 70 In 2010, the National Wildfire Coordinating
Group (NWCG) further defined prescribed fire as a “planned ignition,”
but that characterization did not change the definition. 71 Prescribed fire is
also synonymous with “prescribed burn.” 72 However, federal land
agencies should terminate the use of other colloquial prescribed fire
terms, specifically “controlled burn,” “prescribed natural fire,” and
“natural prescribed fire.”
The term “controlled burn” is misleading and inaccurate. 73
Although a prescribed fire is conducted pursuant to specific weather and
fuel prescriptions, neither the fire nor the weather are controllable. For
67. Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the discretionary function
exception barred recovery resulting from property damage caused by multiple lightning ignited
wildfires); Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *5 (holding the discretionary function exception did not
bar recovery resulting from property damage caused by an escaped prescribed fire).
68. See NWCG#030-2010, supra note 62, at 1.
69. Id. at 3 (recognizing wildland fire to be either (1) wildfire: unplanned ignitions; or (2) prescribed fire: planned ignitions).
70. GLOSSARY, supra note 36, at 139 (defining prescribed fire).
71. Memorandum from the NWCG Chair to NWCG Committee Chairs and Geographic Area
Coordinating Group, NWCG#024-2010, Attachment A, at 5 (Apr. 30, 2010) [hereinafter
NWCG#024-2010], available at http://www.nwcg.gov/general/memos/nwcg-024-2010.html; see,
e.g., Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921 (D. Wyo. 1995).
72. NWCG#024-2010, supra note 71 (stating that “prescribed burn” is a synonym for prescribed fire).
73. Contra id. (stating that “controlled burn” is a synonym for prescribed fire).
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example, wind shifts commonly cause prescribed fires to escape the
prescribed area, 74 or a prescribed fire can burn something within the
prescribed area that was specifically not intended to burn.75 Thus,
because humans cannot control the weather or where an ember travels,
the federal land agencies should not use the term “controlled burn” to
describe a prescribed fire. Instead, the federal land agencies should
simply use the term prescribed fire.
Additionally, the use of the terms “prescribed natural fire” or
“natural prescribed fire” should also be discouraged because the terms
are misleading and inaccurate. During the 1980s, the federal land
agencies used the terms “prescribed natural fire” or “natural prescribed
fire” to describe a fire ignited by lightning that was not suppressed.76
Some federal land agencies, like the USFS, still classify fires ignited by
lightning and not suppressed as a “prescribed natural fire” or a “natural
prescribed fire.” 77 Pursuant to the prescribed fire definition and as
emphasized by the NWCG#030-2010, fires started by lightning are not
human-caused and are not prescribed fires. If a term is used, it should be
wildfire because only wildfire encompasses unplanned ignitions. 78 Thus,
because a “prescribed natural fire” or a “natural prescribed fire” is not a
prescribed fire, the terms inaccurately describe a prescribed fire, and
their use should be curtailed.
Additionally, by using inaccurate, misleading, and inconsistent
terms the federal land agencies may face an unnecessary burden to prove
the federal land agencies’ action actually falls within the discretionary
function exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act.79 As discussed in
Part IV, infra, if the discretionary function exception applies, then the
federal court must dismiss the tort claim because the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. For example, if the federal land agencies abandoned
the “prescribed natural fire” classification and referred to the fire as an
74. E.g., Thune, 872 F. Supp. at 922 (describing that the weather changed and the prescribed
fire escaped).
75. NAT’L PARK SERV., NPS 72 HOUR REPORT: HOLMES INVESTIGATION 2 (Oct. 5, 2004),
available at http://www.nps.gov/fire/download/72HrRpt_GrantWestRxFire.pdf (describing that
prescribed fire personnel put a fire line around the base of the snag to keep fire away from the tree,
but a flying ember set fire to the top of the snag).
76. 1988 FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW, supra note 24, at 1, 8.
77. U.S. FOREST SERV., FSM 2324.22, MANAGEMENT OF FIRE: POLICY (Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives/fsm/2300/2320.doc; Florida v. United States, No. 4:09CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2010).
78. NWCG#024-2010, supra note 71, Attachment A, at 7 (defining “wildfire” as an unplanned
ignition caused by, for example, lightning).
79. Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (discussing effects of naming classification and Federal
Tort Claims Act); Bowen v. United States, No. Civ. 99-443-HA, 1999 WL 1074080, at *1 (D. Or.
Nov. 8, 1999) (improperly classifying a lightning ignited fire as a “prescribed natural fire” that
should have been classified as a wildfire or more specifically at the time, a wildland fire use).
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unplanned fire or wildfire, the federal land agencies’ subsequent actions
are in response to a fire and not the cause of the fire.80 Generally, a
federal land agency’s actions responding to a wildfire easily fall under
the discretionary function exemption.81
In contrast to a prescribed fire, most fires are not intentionally
ignited or are ignited without authority. 82 Wildfires result primarily from
criminal acts, from negligent acts, and from lightning. 83 Although
criminal and negligent acts are beyond the scope of this article, further
distinguishing lightning-caused fires from prescribed fires will provide
some historical clarification. As discussed earlier, lightning-caused fires
that were not suppressed were historically classified as either “prescribed
natural fires” or “natural prescribed fires.” After the significant criticism
resulting from the 1988 Greater Yellowstone “prescribed natural fires,”
the federal land agencies reclassified those unplanned and unsuppressed
fires as “Wildland Fire Use” (WFU). 84
A WFU was a lightning-caused ignition, unintentional and
unplanned, that was allowed to burn within established areas to achieve
specific resource management objectives pursuant to a fire management
plan. 85 Fire management plans provide, an individual unit within a
federal land agency, direction and policy guidance to manage the entire
wildland fire program on that unit.86 Fire management plans also provide
80. See, e.g., McDougal v. U.S. Forest Serv., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Or. 2002) (improperly
calling a lightning ignited fire a “prescribed natural fire” but properly holding the discretionary
function exception barred action).
81. Id.
82. For example, in 2010 the ratio of unplanned fires (wildfires) to planned fires (prescribed
fires) was more than four to one (4:1). NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., 2010 NATIONAL REPORT OF
WILDLAND FIRES AND ACRES BURNED BY STATE 70 (Feb. 9, 2011), available at
http://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/intelligence/2010_statssumm/fires_acres.pdf
(describing
71,971 wildfires and 16,882 prescribed fires).
83. NWCG#024-2010, supra note 71, Attachment A, at 7 (defining wildfire).
84. 1988 FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW, supra note 24, at 19 (stating that the NWCG
was taking the lead in developing common prescribed fire terminology and agencies were to develop
common terminology for “prescribed natural fire” programs); NWCG#024-2010, supra note 71, at 8
(describing Wildland Fire Use as an obsolete term).
85. NWCG#024-2010, supra note 71, at 8 (defining Wildland Fire Use).
86. For lands managed by the National Park Service, Director’s Order #18 requires as follows:
Each park with burnable vegetation must have an approved Fire Management Plan that
will address the need for adequate funding and staffing to support its fire management
program. Parks having an approved Fire Management Plan and accompanying National
Environmental Policy Act compliance may utilize wildland fire to achieve resource benefits in predetermined fire management units. Parks lacking an approved Fire Management Plan may not use resource benefits as a primary consideration influencing the selection of a suppression strategy, but they must consider the resource impacts of suppression
alternatives in their decisions.
NAT’L PARK SERV., DIRECTOR’S ORDER #18: WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 3 (Jan. 16, 2008),
available at http://www.nps.gov/fire/download/fir_wil_do18.pdf.
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the authority from which hazardous fuel treatments or prescribed fire
plans derive. Because a WFU fire was only allowed to burn pursuant to
an approved fire management plan, and prescribed fires are only
authorized pursuant to an approved prescribed fire plan, the WFU and
prescribed fire distinction blurred.87 Without knowing the cause of the
fire, a prescribed fire ignited for ecosystem benefits resembles a WFU
fire managed for ecosystem benefits: both fires are allowed to burn
without significant human involvement and are suppressed only when
the fire breached some predetermined criteria. In practice, however, the
federal land agencies created strict policies that virtually prevented a
wildland fire—wildfire, WFU, or otherwise—from being managed for
multiple objectives.
B. Classification of Fire by Response Instead of by Cause
In 2010, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)
determined that federal land agencies should abandon the traditional fire
classification by cause and, instead, describe a fire by the federal land
agencies’ response. 88 The NWCG emphasized that classifying fires by
cause unnecessarily pigeon-holed the federal land agencies’ ability to
manage a wildland fire because once a fire was classified as a wildfire,
which mandated aggressive suppression strategies, the fire could not then
be managed for multiple objectives. 89 In practice, the traditional policy
meant a wildfire that was suppressed had to be completely suppressed;
the fire could not also have a portion that was allowed to burn for
ecosystem benefits. In contrast, the 2010 policy approach involves an
individual fire assessment and allows land managers to adapt the federal
land agency’s response to the specific circumstances observed and
forecasted for that individual fire. This new policy shift toward

For lands managed by the U.S. Forest Service, Forest Service Handbook 5109.19 requires “[e]ach
National Forest with burnable vegetation must have an approved fire management plan (sec. 52.2)
that has been prepared, reviewed, and approved annually in conformance with requirements set out
in [U.S. Forest Service Manuals and Handbooks.]” U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE
HANDBOOK—FIRE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS AND PLANNING HANDBOOK 4 (Jan. 10, 2003), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/cgi-bin/Directives/get_dirs/fsh?5109.19 (the document is entitled
“5109.19_50.doc” and the section is entitled “50.3 Policy”).
87. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 3:02-CV-02708, 2003 WL 22283969, at *2
n.3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2003) (improperly calling a naturally ignited fire as a prescribed fires).
88. NWCG#030-2010, supra note 62, at 4.
89. Id. at 5; WILDLAND FIRE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, 2008 MODIFICATION TO THE
INTERAGENCY STRATEGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT
POLICY (May 2, 2008), available at http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/ppm/fpc/archives/fire_policy/in
dex.htm.
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individual fire assessments resulted from a policy experimentation
approved by the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC) in 2008.90
The Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security created and authorized the WFLC. The
WFLC is composed of presidential appointees and elected officials and
is the intergovernmental committee that guides the implementation and
coordination of federal wildland fire policy. 91
The recent WFLC policy and NWCG terminology changes allow
land managers the needed flexibility to suppress portions of a lightningcaused fire and to allow a fire to burn for ecosystem benefit in other
areas. 92 For example, if a lightning-caused fire starts near a community
and then spreads into a designated wilderness area that has an approved
fire management plan, instead of complete suppression as required prior
to the WFLC 2008 policy, that fire can now be suppressed adjacent to
the community and managed for ecosystem benefits within the
wilderness. 93 This new approach appropriately balances the need to
protect communities while allowing fires to burn in wilderness areas
where the Wilderness Act specifically restricts human modification of
natural processes.
The new multiple objective policy also strikes the appropriate
balance for prescribed fire. Specifically, this policy changes how
prescribed fires are managed, especially when a prescribed fire escapes a
designated area. Prior to the WFLC 2008 policy, once a prescribed fire
escaped, the entire prescribed fire was converted to a wildfire and
aggressively suppressed. 94 Now, the WFLC 2008 policy still converts the
escaped prescribed fire into a wildfire, but if portions of the fire are still
achieving the intent of the prescribed fire and are not threatening other
resources, those portions do not have to be suppressed. This change
allows land managers to effectively suppress threatening portions of the
fire to resolve any public fear, while not committing destructive
suppression actions within the original prescribed fire area.
In conclusion, the federal land managers responsible for wildland
fire programs should welcome the recent fire terminology and policy
90. WILDLAND FIRE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, supra note 89.
91. Memorandum of Understanding Wildland Fire Leadership Council (Apr. 12, 2010), available at http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/leadership/documents/mou_wflc_april2010.pdf.
92. 2012 REDBOOK, supra note 30, at 09-3 (PDF page 178) (describing that human-caused
wildfires will be suppressed at the lowest cost with the fewest negative consequences with respect to
firefighter and public safety).
93. Van Wagtendonk, supra note 19 (describing that as a result of the policy changes wilderness will continue “to be the primary area where wildfires are allowed to burn” because of the remoteness and preference for ecological processes to proceed without human intervention).
94. WILDLAND FIRE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, supra note 89.
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changes. During a time when policies could have further limited a land
manager’s discretion, the recent Wildland Fire Leadership Council’s
policy change actually encourages discretion and strikes an appropriate
balance between community protection and ecosystem health. Federal
land managers now have the option to aggressively suppress a portion of
a fire while appropriately allowing another portion of the fire to burn
naturally. 95 This adaptive management approach will likely enable the
federal land agencies to reestablish fire in fire dependent ecosystems and
reduce government spending associated with costly fire suppression. To
better communicate this new adaptive management policy change, the
National Wildfire Coordinating Group revised the fire terminology to
consistently and accurately describe a federal land agency’s approach to
fire management. The new terminology and classification policy will
also minimize confusion during any subsequent legal challenge under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
IV. PRESCRIBED FIRE AND THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
It is a legal document . . . with all the information needed to implement
the prescribed fire. Prescribed Fire projects must be implemented in
compliance with the written plan.
—National Wildfire Coordinating Group (2008) 96

A. Overview
When a prescribed fire escapes, especially a prescribed fire
conducted to reduce the threat of a wildfire near private property,
property damage claims may result.97 Those resulting tort claims, when
brought against an agency of the federal government, face an unusual
95. Contra Karen M. Bradshaw, A Modern Overview of Wildfire Law, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 445, 476 n.162 (2010) (discussing the same source as identified in supra note 62 and positing
that NWCG#030-2010 was used to facilitate media attention and prolong fire durations).
96. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16; 2012 REDBOOK, supra note 30 (describing
the 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE is still binding through 2012).
97. E.g., Michigan v. United States, No. 2:11-CV-00303, 2011 WL 7267049 (W.D. Mich. filed
Aug. 12, 2011) (currently litigating a motion to dismiss based on the discretionary function exception because a U.S. Forest Service prescribed fire—broadcast burning—escaped and allegedly damaged state lands valued at $85,000); Wipf v. United States, No. 5:09-CV-05033, 2010 WL 3333540
(D. S.D. settled Sept. 16, 2010) (plaintiff alleged $346,056 in property damage resulting from an
escaped prescribed fire—pile burning—that the U.S. Forest Service conducted); Martini v. United
States, No. 0:04-CV-03518, 2005 WL 3024645 (D. Minn. dismissed by stipulation Jan. 9, 2006)
(plaintiff alleged $22,000 in property damage resulting from an escaped prescribed fire—broadcast
burning—that the U.S. Forest Service conducted); Richardson v. United States, No. 1:03-CV-03177,
2004 WL 3333253 (D. S.C. settled Jan. 20, 2005) (plaintiff alleged prescribed fire plan was too
liberal and also alleged $138,000 in property damage resulting from an escaped prescribed fire—
broadcast burning—that the U.S. Forest Service conducted).
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procedural and substantive hurdle: the discretionary function exception
to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the
United States’ sovereign immunity for negligence suits involving federal
government employees. 98 However, that waiver is limited by the
discretionary function exception. If the federal agency’s conduct falls
within the discretionary function exception, then the tort claim is
dismissed because the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 99
Thus, the discretionary function exception shields the federal
government from liability only in limited circumstances. While the
Federal Tort Claims Act provides the traditional means to recover
monetary damages, some parties harmed by an escaped prescribed fire
have also recovered monetary damages through the political process.
Two escaped prescribed fires—the Lowden Ranch fire in California
and the Cerro Grande fire in New Mexico—spurred hundreds of
individual damage claims. 100 Surprisingly, nearly all of those claims,
which cost the United States more than $1 billion, settled out-of-court
and without litigating the discretionary function exception. 101
In 1999, the Bureau of Land Management planned and ignited a
100-acre prescribed fire, the Lowden Ranch prescribed fire, to reduce the
spread of noxious weeds near Redding, California. 102 Pursuant to Bureau
of Land Management policy, a prescribed fire plan was drafted that
included specific conditions, or prescriptions, which had to be satisfied
before the prescribed fire was ignited.103 With wind speeds exceeding the
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2011) (stating waiver of sovereign immunity for negligence suits); 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2011) (stating what is called the discretionary function exception); e.g., United
States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995) (describing that an ambiguity resulting from a waiver
of sovereign immunity is to be construed in favor of immunity); Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F.2d
951, 952 (10th Cir. 1991) (describing that the waiver of sovereign immunity is limited by the discretionary function exception).
99. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 949 F.2d 332, 334 (10th Cir. 1991) (dismissing negligence
suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the National Park Service’s actions in conducting
a rescue fell within the discretionary function exception).
100. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., LOWDEN RANCH PRESCRIBED FIRE REVIEW 6 (July 22,
1999) [hereinafter LOWDEN REVIEW], available at http://www.nationalfiretraining.net/userfiles/Grea
tBasin/Erin/lowden_escaped_rx_review.pdf; NAT’L PARK SERV., CERRO GRANDE PRESCRIBED FIRE
BOARD OF INQUIRY FINAL REPORT, at ii (Feb. 26, 2001) [hereinafter CERRO GRANDE
INQUIRY], available at http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Cerro%20Grande%20Final%20Report
%202001.pdf.
101. BARRY T. HILL, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-00-257, FIRE
MANAGEMENT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CERRO GRANDE (LOS ALAMOS) FIRE 2 (2000) [hereinafter GAO CERRO GRANDE], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/108587.pdf (describing
that the fire burned about 48,000 acres and damages were estimated at $1 billion).
102. LOWDEN REVIEW, supra note 100, at 10 (describing a prescribed fire of 100-acres at
Lowden Ranch ignited in an effort to eliminate star thistle and improve the ecosystem).
103. Held v. Dep't of the Interior, SF-0752-00-0298-I-1, 2002 WL 31305205, at ¶3 (M.S.P.B.
Sept. 30, 2002) (describing that the prescribed fire plan defined the maximum allowable wind speed
and the number of required fire engines).
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maximum prescription and without sufficient fire engines, the prescribed
fire was ignited. 104 Consequently, within three hours of ignition the
prescribed fire escaped and a wildfire was declared. 105 Eventually, the
fire was suppressed, and the federal government alone spent nearly $20
million to suppress it. 106 In addition, over 350 tort claims were filed
pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act after the Lowden Ranch
prescribed fire burned over 2,000 acres and damaged twenty-three
homes. 107 Although the vast majority of the cases appear to have settled,
a few cases proceeded through motion practice and likely settled without
trial. 108 Interestingly, of the reported cases and briefs, the United States
did not invoke the discretionary function exception to shield the Bureau
of Land Management from liability. 109 Thus, for the victims of the
Lowden Ranch prescribed fire, the United States settled smaller claims
through the administrative process 110 and larger claims pursuant to the
Treasury’s Judgment Fund process. 111
Rather than use the Federal Tort Claims Act, the victims of the
Cerro Grande fire used a special victim compensation statute that
Congress quickly enacted as an alternate process to settle damage claims.
In particular, the National Park Service prepared and approved a
prescribed fire plan to reduce hazard fuels in Bandelier National
Monument, New Mexico. 112 On May 4, 2000, the National Park Service
ignited the Cerro Grande prescribed fire to burn up to 900 acres, but the

104. Id.; LOWDEN REVIEW, supra note 100, at 27–29 (describing wind speeds exceeded maximum allowable and only one fire engine, of the required four, was onsite).
105. LOWDEN REVIEW, supra note 100, at 14–15 (describing the prescribed fire was ignited at
10:50 AM and a wildfire was declared by 1:00 PM).
106. Held, 2002 WL 31305205, at ¶2.
107. Robinson v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (describing more
than 350 other claims and three other cases were pending).
108. E.g., id. at 1218 n.2 (describing that this decision will likely help resolve more than 100
similar cases); Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 3, Trinity County v. United States, No. 02-16654,
2002 WL 32625738 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing that the United States offered to settle during the
administrative process).
109. Robinson, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 1215; Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 3, Trinity County v.
United States, No. 02-16654, 2002 WL 32625738 (9th Cir. 2002).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2011) (describing that the head of the appropriate federal agency may
settle and pay up to $2,500 for a tort claim during the administrative process); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)
(2011) (describing that the claimant must initially submit the tort claim to the appropriate federal
agency, which then has six months to settle or deny the claim, before the claim may be filed in
court); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (2011) (describing that Standard Form 95 can initiate the administrative
tort claim).
111. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2011) (describing the judgment fund’s application for claims greater
than the $2,500 payable by the agency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2672); The Judgment Fund Background, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Mar. 11, 2011), http://fms.treas.gov/judgefund/background.html.
112. CERRO GRANDE INQUIRY, supra note 100, at 6 (describing the prescribed fire plans for
Upper Frijoles burn units, which later became known as the Cerro Grande prescribed fire).
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prescribed fire escaped. 113 By the time the resulting wildfire was
contained on May 19, it had burned nearly 48,000 acres, caused damages
amounting to $1 billion, and damaged 235 structures including parts of
the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 114 The National Park Service
openly admitted responsibility for the damages caused by the prescribed
fire, and Congress responded by appropriating more than $660 million to
compensate injured victims. 115 Because Congress passed the victim
compensation statute on July 13, 2000—less than two months after the
fire was contained—those injured parties never had to use the Federal
Tort Claims Act to litigate tort liability. 116 Thus, if a federal land agency
openly admits responsibility for the damages and if Congress enacts a
special victim compensation fund, then injured parties of a prescribed
fire do not need the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Even though injured parties from the escaped Cerro Grande
prescribed fire successfully recovered damages through non-judicial
methods, future injured parties should not have to rely on the enactment
of special legislation. Congress specifically enacted the Federal Tort
Claims Act to accord injured parties a reliable recovery opportunity.
Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) to provide
injured parties a mechanism to remedy damages by waiving the federal
government’s sovereign immunity. 117 However, Congress did not
completely waive the United States’ sovereign immunity with the
passage of the FTCA. Indeed, the FTCA included a preliminary
threshold requirement that divests a federal court of subject matter
jurisdiction. 118 That threshold bar is known as the discretionary function

113. GAO CERRO GRANDE, supra note 101, at 2–4 (describing the Cerro Grande prescribed
fire started on May 4 and was substantially contained by May 19).
114. Id. at 2 (describing that the fire burned about 48,000 acres and damages were estimated at
$1 billion); CERRO GRANDE INQUIRY, supra note 100, at ii (destroying more than 235 structures and
damaging other resources including the Los Alamos National Laboratory).
115. CERRO GRANDE INQUIRY, supra note 100, at ii (describing the National Park Service admission of responsibility); Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act, Pub. L. 106-246, div. C, §§ 101–106,
114 Stat. 511, 582–590 (July 13, 2000) (appropriating more than $660 million to remedy damages).
116. The federal courts adjudicated two cases related to the Cerro Grande prescribed fire, but
they did not involve tort claims. One case involved a disputed settlement agreement derived from
the victim compensation fund. Evans-Carmichael v. United States, 343 Fed. App’x 294 (10th Cir.
2009). The other case involved criminal charges resulting from fraudulent attempts to receive victim
compensation funds. United States v. Medley, 476 F.3d 835, 836 (10th Cir. 2007).
117. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 535 (1988) (indicating the FTCA partially
waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2011) (discretionary function exception to the FTCA); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17–18 (1953) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 2680 limits subject matter jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
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exception, and federal land agencies have used it extensively in response
to damage claims caused by wildfires and prescribed fires. 119
The discretionary function exception is a powerful shield for the
federal government. Regardless of the underlying negligence action,
once a federal land agency successfully convinces a federal district court
that the discretionary function exception applies, the case is dismissed
without the court even considering the underlying negligence claim. 120
However, even if the plaintiff ousts the government from behind the
discretionary function exception shield, the plaintiff must still prove the
underlying negligence action to the court. 121 Because the discretionary
function exception has been used and construed so favorably for the
federal government, the number of prescribed fire related tort claims that
exposed the government from behind that shield was almost nonexistent
until recently.
In Florida v. United States, decided in 2010, the district court
appropriately concluded the discretionary function exception did not
apply to a prescribed fire tort claim, and the rationale used in that
decision will likely alter the way future courts construe the discretionary
function exception as applied to prescribed fire. 122 Specifically, when a
federal land agency actually creates the fire hazard by intentionally
igniting a prescribed fire pursuant to a non-discretionary prescribed fire
plan and that prescribed fire consequently escapes and causes harm,
courts should follow the rationale used in Florida and conclude the
discretionary function exception does not apply. 123 That conclusion best
comports with Congress’ intent in enacting the FTCA, the recent line of
prescribed fire cases, and the Supreme Court’s precedent.

119. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the discretionary function exception applied to the USFS resulting from wildfire spreading from national
forest to private ranch); Backfire 2000 v. United States, 273 Fed. App’x 661 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
the discretionary function exception applied to the USFS's decision to set backfires while combating
a wildfire); Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921, 925 (D. Wyo. 1995) (holding the discretionary
function exception barred personal property damages claim resulting from an escaped prescribed
fire).
120. Layton v. United States, 984 F.2d 1496, 1502 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Whether these employees
were negligent in making any of these decisions is irrelevant.”); Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d
1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that the discretionary function exception applies even when the
acts constitute an abuse of discretion); Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018,
1029 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that negligence is simply irrelevant to the discretionary function
exception inquiry).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (describing that there is no right to a jury trial under the Federal Tort
Claims Act); United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 700 n.10 (1961) (describing no right to a jury
trial).
122. Florida v. United States, No. 4:09-CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 30,
2010).
123. Id.
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B. The Federal Tort Claims Act
124

In 1948, Congress enacted the FTCA as a means of holding the
federal government liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances.” 125 Yet, Congress retained
sovereign immunity for certain discretionary government functions. 126
Additionally, the FTCA provides the federal courts with exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil claims seeking monetary damages against the
United States:
[To all civil actions for money damages] accruing on and after
January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 127

However, if the alleged tort derived from a permissible exercise of
policy judgment, then the discretionary function exception shields the
government from liability, and the court is divested of subject matter
jurisdiction. 128 Specifically, the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA provides the following:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
not apply to—
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
124. In 1948, Congress repealed the 1946 version of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and Congress also reenacted the Federal Tort Claims Act as it substantively appears today. Compare 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (2011) (enacted June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 933), and 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2011)
(enacted June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982), with United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154
(1963) (describing that the Federal Tort Claims Act was part of the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (Aug. 2, 1946) and was intended to “eliminate the burden on Congress
of investigating and passing upon private bills seeking individual relief.”).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2011).
126. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S.
797, 808 (1984).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2011).
128. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 537 (1988) (describing that the discretionary
function exception insulates the government from liability from permissive discretionary acts);
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17–18 (1953) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 2680 limits subject
matter jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)); Green v. United States, 630 F.3d 1245, 1249–
50 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that if the discretionary function exception is satisfied, then the federal
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction).
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agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused. 129

Thus, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act as a means of
providing injured parties an opportunity to recover damages caused by
the federal government. However, because the FTCA did not specifically
define “a discretionary function,” the Supreme Court has had the
opportunity to interpret the meaning of the discretionary function
provision.
1. The Berkovitz Two-Pronged Test
In Berkovitz v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated a twopronged test to determine whether the alleged tortious government action
falls within the limited confines of the discretionary function
exception. 130 In particular, the Berkovitz Court provided the following
principles for lower courts to use when analyzing whether the
discretionary function exception applies:
This exception . . . marks the boundary between Congress’
willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its
desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to
suit by private individuals . . . it is the nature of the conduct, rather
than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary
function exception applies in a given case. 131

Although the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting sufficient
evidence to establish an issue of material fact, the government bears the
burden of proving both prongs of the discretionary function exception. 132
Thus, if the court concludes that the government failed to satisfy either
prong, the discretionary function exception does not apply. 133
First, a court determines whether the government employee’s
conduct is a matter of judgment or choice.134 The discretionary function
exception does not apply where “a federal statute, regulation, or policy
specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow

129. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2011).
130. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536–37.
131. Id. at 536.
132. Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing the plaintiff’s and
the government’s burdens); McDougal v. U.S. Forest Serv., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1232 (D. Or.
2002).
133. Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1454 n.10 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that if the
government fails to satisfy the second part of the two-part test, the court does not need to address
whether the government satisfied the first part of the test).
134. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
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because the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the
directive.” 135
Second, if the conduct involved an element of judgment, then the
court determines whether “that judgment is of the kind that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”136 The
Supreme Court has construed this prong as preserving the separation of
federal powers; Congress created the discretionary function exception
“to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative
decisions grounded in social, economic, or political policy through the
medium of an action in tort.” 137 In particular, the Gaubert Court
provided the following example to show that not all discretionary acts
fall within the discretionary function example:
There are obviously discretionary acts performed by a Government
agent that are within the scope of his employment but not within the
discretionary function exception because these acts cannot be said
to be based on the purposes that the regulatory regime seeks to
accomplish. If one of the officials involved in this case drove an
automobile on a mission connected with his official duties and
negligently collided with another car, the exception would not
apply. Although driving requires the constant exercise of discretion,
the official's decisions in exercising that discretion can hardly be
said to be grounded in regulatory policy. 138

Thus, once a mandatory directive prescribes a course of action, like
obeying traffic laws in the Gaubert example, that directive terminates
any further use of discretion the employee originally had because the
employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. Therefore,
the discretionary function exception protects only governmental actions
and decisions based on a permissible exercise of policy judgment.
2. Applying the Discretionary Function Exception to Prescribed Fire
The federal land agencies have used the discretionary function
exception extensively in response to damages caused by wildfire, but
135. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991); Miller, 163 F.3d at 593 (citing
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). But see Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1453 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“[T] he presence of a few, isolated provisions cast in mandatory language does not transform an
otherwise suggestive set of guidelines into binding agency regulations.”).
136. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536–37.
137. Id.
138. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 n.7; Duke v. Dep't of Agric., 131 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir.
1997) (concluding the discretionary function exception did not apply to a U.S. Forest Service decision not to warn campers of danger from rolling boulders); Caplan v. United States, 877 F.2d 1314,
1316 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that the discretionary function exception would not apply when a federal employee runs a red light with a motor vehicle and causes an accident).
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courts have only adjudicated its use in response to escaped prescribed
fires in two cases. 139 However, the government has asserted the
discretionary function exception in response to prescribed fire claims at
least five times, and the plaintiffs recovered through settlement in four of
the five cases. 140
Although wildfires and prescribed fires may appear similar, a
federal land agency’s conduct is completely different between the two.
On a prescribed fire, the federal land agency’s actions actually create the
hazard by intentionally igniting the fire. In contrast, on a wildfire, the
federal land agency’s actions, generally, focus on suppressing fire.
In response to a wildfire, the federal land agencies have
significantly more discretion in deciding which strategy to use: whether
to suppress the fire in its entirety, whether to allow the fire to burn for
ecosystem benefits, or whether to choose a combination of suppression
and natural burning. Additionally, given one of the above responses, a
federal land agency has significant discretion in choosing tactics and
where to apply those tactics. For example, a federal land agency could
choose to use hand crews 141 to construct minimal fire breaks, or it could
choose to deploy heavy equipment into the area to construct expansive
fire breaks. 142 Thus, the federal land agency has discretion when
responding to a wildfire, but it does not have such discretion when it

139. Florida v. United States, No. 4:09-CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug.
30, 2010) (holding the discretionary function exception did not apply and the parties later settled).
Contra Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921 (D. Wyo. 1995) (holding the discretionary function
exception shielded the United States).
140. Compare Wipf v. United States, No. 5:09-CV-05033, 2010 WL 3333540 (D. S.D. settled
Sept. 16, 2010) (plaintiff alleged $346,056 in property damage, the United States asserted the discretionary function exception, but the parties later settled), and Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2
(plaintiff alleged $2.8 million in property damage, the court held the discretionary function exception did not apply, and the parties later settled), and Martini v. United States, No. 0:04-CV-03518,
2005 WL 3024645 (D. Minn. dismissed by stipulation Jan. 9, 2006) (plaintiff alleged $22,000 in
property damage, the United States asserted the discretionary function exception, but the parties later
settled), and Richardson v. United States, No. 1:03-CV-03177, 2004 WL 3333253 (D. S.C. settled
Jan. 20, 2005) (plaintiff alleged $138,000 in property damage, the United States asserted the discretionary function exception, and the parties later settled), with Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp.
921 (D. Wyo. 1995) (dismissing the $43,000 tort claim because the discretionary function exception
shielded the United States). See Michigan v. United States, No. 2:11-CV-00303, 2011 WL 7267049
(W.D. Mich. filed Aug. 12, 2011) (currently litigating a motion to dismiss based on the discretionary
function exception because a U.S. Forest Service prescribed fire escaped and allegedly damaged
state lands valued at $85,000).
141. Traditionally, a hand crew is a twenty-person fire crew outfitted with hand tools like
shovels and chainsaws.
142. A fire break involves removal of enough burnable material to prevent a fire from spreading across that line. A fire break constructed by a hand crew, generally, involves removing an eight
foot swath of vegetation, while a fire break constructed by heavy equipment, like a dozer, is at least
as wide as the dozer’s blade.
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intentionally ignites a prescribed fire because of the mandatory
prescribed fire plan.
A federal land agency’s actions involving prescribed fire are on the
opposite side of the discretionary continuum. Because prescribed fires
are intentionally ignited, the appropriate inquiries should focus on (1)
whether the federal land agency planned the prescribed fire pursuant to
agency directives, and (2) whether the federal land agency implemented
the prescribed fire in accord with those agency directives and the
mandatory prescribed fire plan. However, courts have inconsistently
applied the Berkovitz two-pronged test to prescribed fire claims.
3. Prescribed Fire Cases
In 1995, two prescribed fire tort liability cases were decided that
reached opposite outcomes—one by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
holding the USFS liable, and the other by the U.S. District Court of
Wyoming holding the discretionary function exception applied and that
barred any further litigation. 143 Those two cases from 1995 provided
confusing judicial guidance that lasted until 2010. In 2010, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Florida broke the fifteen year
silence by holding the discretionary function exception did not bar
recovery resulting from a prescribed fire tort claim. 144
a) Anderson: Liability Without a Discretionary Function Exception
Analysis
In Anderson v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded the USFS was liable, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, for
“negligently setting and controlling” the escaped prescribed fire that
resulted in private property damage. 145
In Anderson, the USFS and the California Department of Forestry
planned a 500-acre prescribed fire to reduce the threat of subsequent
wildfires by removing available fuel. 146 This specific prescribed fire
project was primarily conducted by the USFS to burn highly flammable,
chaparral, vegetation on the Cleveland National Forest in Southern
California. In 1990, the USFS ignited the prescribed fire, but on the
eighth day post-ignition, the prescribed fire, pushed by gusty winds, 147

143. Anderson v. United States, 55 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995); Thune, 872 F. Supp. at 921.
144. Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *4–5.
145. Anderson, 55 F.3d at 1382.
146. Id. at 1380.
147. Jim Carlton and Ted Johnson, A Summer Siege, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1990,
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1990-06-29/local/me-951_1_carbon-canyon-fire (“The fire jumped
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escaped and caused at least $4 million in damages to several homes and
vehicles. 148 The appellate court concluded that because a private party
would be liable under California law for “negligently setting and
controlling the fire,” the USFS was liable.149
Interestingly, the USFS did not assert the discretionary function
exception, 150 and thus the Anderson court did not evaluate the Berkovitz
two-pronged test. 151 Therefore, Anderson stands for the proposition that,
in a negligence analysis, a federal land agency can be liable for property
damage resulting from an escaped prescribed fire, but Anderson has
limited value in discretionary function exception analysis because the
question was never raised.
b) Thune: The Discretionary Function Exception Barred the Claim
In a similar case, decided the same year as Anderson, a district court
in another circuit reached a different conclusion. Unlike the appellate
court in Anderson, the district court in Thune v. United States concluded
the USFS’s conduct fell within the discretionary function exception.152
In Thune, the USFS planned a 3000-acre prescribed fire to improve
elk habitat in the Bridger-Teton National Forest in northwest
Wyoming. 153 The plaintiff was a hunting guide, operating under a USFS
license, who maintained a base camp within the national forest. 154 In
1991, the USFS ignited the prescribed fire pursuant to a prescribed fire
plan. 155 During the following afternoon, the wind and weather changed
and that caused the prescribed fire to escape.156 The government ordered
evacuations, and following those orders the plaintiff left the area but did
the control line Sunday afternoon, however, and by Wednesday had flared into a raging inferno
under 105-degree temperatures and high winds, Olson said.”).
148. Anderson, 55 F.3d at 1380; JACQUES BOURRINET, WILDLAND FIRES AND THE LAW 150
(1992), available at http://books.google.com (search “Wildland fires and the law”; click on book
hyperlink; then search “Bedford Fire”) (calling the escaped prescribed fire the Bedford Fire and
causing more than $4,000,000 in claims against the United States).
149. Anderson, 55 F.3d at 1382.
150. Generally, the Assistant United States Attorney requests approval from the appropriate
Torts Branch staff prior to raising a discretionary function exception. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
MANUAL, TORTS BRANCH PROCEDURES—SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN FTCA LITIGATION
4-5.220 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title4/5mci
v.htm#4-5.220.
151. Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 597 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing the lack of discretionary function analysis in Anderson).
152. Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921 (D. Wyo. 1995).
153. Id. at 922.
154. Id. at 922–23.
155. Id. at 922 (describing the prescribed fire was conducted pursuant to a prescribed fire plan,
but the Thune decision does not indicate whether the prescribed fire plan was a mandatory directive—like current prescribed fire plans—or an optional guidance document).
156. Id. at 922–23.
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not have the necessary six to nine hours to completely pack up his
camp. 157 As a result, the escaped prescribed fire burned the plaintiff’s
camp causing approximately $43,000 in personal property damage. 158
The plaintiff brought a tort claim alleging the USFS was negligent in (1)
setting and controlling the fire, and (2) providing insufficient evacuation
notice. 159
The district court, however, dismissed the tort claim because it
concluded the USFS’s conduct fell within the discretionary function
exception. 160 The district court applied the Berkovitz two-pronged test
and determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the
USFS ignited the prescribed fire based on a number of fuel, weather, and
policy factors that required the USFS to make discretionary judgments,
and (2) those discretionary judgments were based on the public policy to
improve elk habitat.161 Thus, the Thune court completed both prongs of
the Berkovitz test and concluded the USFS’s conduct was a permissive
exercise of discretion.
The plaintiff also asserted a claim for inverse condemnation, but he
later withdrew that claim believing the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction on that issue. 162 That second claim was then re-filed
with the Federal Court of Claims, which later dismissed it for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because it sounded in tort.163
Although Thune was decided by a district court, the decision stood
for the proposition that a federal land agency could use the discretionary
function exception as a liability shield resulting from a prescribed fire.
After fifteen years, however, that proposition was severely weakened by
another district court.
c) Florida: the Discretionary Function Exception Does Not Apply
In stark contrast to the district court in Thune, the district court in
Florida v. United States determined that the USFS’s conduct in planning
and implementing the prescribed fire did not fall within the discretionary
function exception. 164
In Florida, the USFS planned a 1500-acre prescribed fire to reduce
the threat of wildfires by removing fuel on the Osceola National Forest
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 924.
160. Id .at 925.
161. Id. at 924–25.
162. Id. at 923.
163. Thune v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 49, 54 (1998).
164. Florida v. United States, No. 4:09-CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug.
30, 2010).
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in Florida. 165 In 2004, the USFS ignited the prescribed fire, and within a
few hours USFS staff determined the fire was out of control and not in
prescription. 166 Five days after ignition, the USFS declared the escaped
prescribed fire a wildfire and began suppression actions.167 The fire
eventually burned more than 34,000 acres.168 The USFS’s internal
investigation found (1) the planning and (2) the implementation of the
initial prescribed fire did not comply with USFS policy directives and (3)
strong wind gusts contributed to the escape.169
The Florida court determined the USFS failed the first prong of the
Berkovitz two-pronged test because the USFS’s “admissions demonstrate
a clear disobedience to mandates that are not discretionary. While [the
USFS] may have had discretion as to the analysis conducted within the
[Prescribed Fire] Plan, [the USFS] had no judgment or choice whether to
complete a [Prescribed Fire] Plan and then follow it once approved.”170
Therefore, Florida stands for the proposition that the discretionary
function exception does not apply to a tort claim resulting from planning
or implementing a prescribed fire that later escapes.
4. Comparing Anderson, Thune, and Florida
A court attempting to distinguish the differences among these three
cases may end up creating holographic distinctions. Factually, all three
of these cases are identical: all three cases involved the USFS igniting
large prescribed fires on USFS administered property; all three cases
involved prescribed fires escaping the prescribed areas and damaging
private property; and all three prescribed fires escaped as a result of
changing weather factors, primarily strong gusty winds.
Although the fact patterns are identical, the courts reached different
outcomes by framing the discretionary function exception or liability
analysis at different moments. The Thune court framed the discretionary
function exception analysis at the time the USFS decided to actually
ignite the prescribed fire. The Thune court described that the USFS
employee initiating the prescribed fire had to use judgment and had to

165. Id at *4−5; U.S. FOREST SERV., OSCEOLA RANGER DISTRICT COMPARTMENTS 16 AND 1
17 ESCAPED FIRE REVIEW 1−2 (Mar. 19, 2004) [hereinafter OSCEOLA], available at http://training.n
wcg.gov/pre-courses/rx301/Impassable_Bay_Compartments_16_and_117_Review_2004.pdf
(describing that the escaped prescribed fire involved in Florida was initially called the Compartments
16 and 117 Prescribed Fire and later called the Impassable Bay Fire).
166. OSCEOLA, supra note 165, at 2.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1.
169. Id. at 13–17.
170. Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *4.
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make decisions based on weather, seasonal factors,171 but those
judgments would now be subject to the mandatory prescribed fire plan.
Unfortunately, the Thune court based its decision on analogy to a
lightning-caused wildfire case.172 Because the Thune court framed the
issue by improper analogy to discretionary government conduct in
response to a wildfire, as opposed to a prescribed fire, the district court
did not evaluate whether the USFS mandated the employee to plan and
implement the Thune prescribed fire pursuant to the prescribed fire plan.
In contrast, current federal land agency policy now mandates that
employees must plan and implement prescribed fire pursuant to nondiscretionary requirements.173 Therefore, the rationale used in Thune has
limited utility because prescribed fire policies have changed significantly
since 1991, and the current policy specifically delineates a course of
action that a government employee must follow.
The Florida court appropriately framed the issue by not only
considering the USFS employee’s judgment at the time burning initiated,
but it also analyzed the overall context. The court primarily evaluated (1)
whether that specific prescribed fire plan complied with USFS policy
directives; and (2) whether that specific prescribed fire was implemented
pursuant to that prescribed fire plan and USFS policy directives. Without
analyzing whether the USFS was negligent or judicially second guessing
the USFS’s purpose for the prescribed fire, the court appropriately
concluded that the USFS did not have “judgment or choice whether to
complete a [Prescribed Fire] Plan and then follow it once approved.”174
This contextual distinction is critical to assessing whether the
government’s conduct fell within the discretionary function exception.
When the USFS ignited the prescribed fire in Florida, the USFS
had mandated planning and implementation directives for prescribed fire
that the USFS employees failed to follow. 175 Because the USFS had
conducted a thorough escaped-fire investigation and found that its
employees had failed to follow mandated USFS policies, the USFS
essentially provided the plaintiffs the necessary evidence to successfully
defeat a discretionary function exception motion. Since the USFS ignited
171. Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D. Wyo. 1995) (concluding the USFS
employee had to consider the temperature, the wind, the weather forecast, the season, and other
considerations, including the broad policy behind the prescribed fire).
172. Id. at 925 (citing Parsons v. United States, 811 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D. Cal. 1992)) (describing a lightning ignited wildfire).
173. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 3 (describing the new requirements as a
result of the 2003 Interagency Strategy for the Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, which was developed after the 2000 Cerro Grande prescribed fire escape).
174. Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *4.
175. OSCEOLA, supra note 165, at 4–6.
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the Florida prescribed fire in 2004, all the federal land agencies have
actually strengthened their non-discretionary prescribed fire mandates
and agreed to abide by a mandatory set of prescribed fire planning and
implementation requirements.176
5. Prescribed Fire Plans
After the 2000 Cerro Grande prescribed fire escape, the federal land
agencies addressed a number of policy level weaknesses.177 Initially in
2006, and then again in 2008, the federal land agencies agreed that
“[p]rescribed fire projects can only be implemented through an approved
Prescribed Fire Plan.” 178 Specifically, the National Park Service, the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, and the U.S. Forest Service agreed that the 2008
Prescribed Fire Guide would provide “unified direction”179 and set the
requirements for “what is minimally acceptable for prescribed fire
planning and implementation.” 180 Like other policy documents published
by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, the 2008 Prescribed Fire
Guide was drafted by representatives and subject matter experts from the
federal land agencies and remains in effect until superseded.181
Additionally, although individual federal land agencies are free to
impose more restrictive standards and policies directives, the agencies all
agreed to the minimum mandates articulated in the 2008 Prescribed Fire
Guide. 182
In particular, the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide mandates how a
federal land agency shall plan and implement a prescribed fire. First, the
2008 Prescribed Fire Guide requires that a thorough planning and
review process must be conducted to generate a site-specific
176. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 3.
177. CERRO GRANDE INQUIRY, supra note 100, at i (describing that the 2000 Cerro Grande fire
exposed a number of policy weaknesses and that the federal land agencies “will provide remedies
for these problems and strengthen the prescribed fire program at all levels”).
178. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 7. If any prescribed fire was conducted
after September 2006 but before July 2008, the prior version would be binding. 2006 INTERAGENCY
PRESCRIBED FIRE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES GUIDE 6 (Sept. 2006), available
at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/fire/PDF's/rxfireguide.pdf.
179. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 4.
180. Id. at 7. The 2006 version also had the same or similar non-discretionary language. 2006
INTERAGENCY PRESCRIBED FIRE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES GUIDE 6 (Sept.
2006), available at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/fire/PDF's/rxfireguide.pdf.
181. 2012 REBOOK, supra note 30 (PDF page 286) (describing the 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE
GUIDE is still binding through 2012); Memorandum from the NWCG Chair to Interagency Wildland
Fire Management Personnel, NWCG#015-2008, Interagency Prescribed Fire Planning
and Implementation Procedures Guide (Aug. 6, 2008), available at http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/p
pm/fpc/archives/fire_policy/rx/rx-memo.pdf.
182. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 7.

2012]

A New Era of Federal Prescribed Fire

311

implementation plan for each prescribed fire.183 During the planning
process, a federal land agency must draft the prescribed fire plan—the
site specific implementation plan—using the twenty-one element
prescribed fire plan template.184 The required template includes the
following elements and appendices: 185
1. Signature Page
2. Go/No-Go Checklists
3. Complexity Analysis
4. Description of the Prescribed Fire Area
5. Objectives
6. Funding
7. Prescription
8. Scheduling
9. Pre-burn Considerations and Weather
10. Briefing
11. Organization and Equipment
12. Communication
13. Public and Personnel Safety, Medical
14. Test Fire
15. Ignition Plan
16. Holding Plan
17. Contingency Plan
18. Wildfire Conversion
19. Smoke Management and Air Quality
20. Monitoring
21. Post-burn Activities
22. Appendices
A. Maps
B. Technical Review Checklist
C. Complexity Analysis
D. Job Hazard Analysis
E. Fire Behavior Modeling or Empirical Evidence
Thus, by requiring the drafter of a prescribed fire plan to methodically
and thoroughly address each element in the template, the federal land
agencies created a system to minimize prescribed fire escapes to avoid
an event like the Cerro Grande prescribed fire disaster.

183. Id. at 11.
184. Id. at 19; e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., REFERENCE MANUAL 18: WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEM
ENT, ch. 7, at 35−36 (2008), available at http://www.nps.gov/fire/download/fir_wil_rm18.pdf (PDF
pages 147–48) (describing twenty-one element requirement of prescribed fire plans in chapter 7.3).
185. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra 16, at 19–27.
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After the federal land agency drafts the prescribed fire plan, the
plan must receive a technical review and approval before ignition
occurs. 186 The technical reviewer must not have actually prepared the
prescribed fire plan but should have sufficient knowledge of the
proposed project to ensure the stated objectives can be safely and
successfully achieved when properly implemented. 187 Once the
prescribed fire plan passes the technical review process, it goes to the
agency administrator for approval. After the agency administrator
approves the plan, it becomes the site-specific implementation
document: the “[p]rescribed fire projects must be implemented in
compliance with the written plan.” 188 Importantly, the prescribed fire
plan “is a legal document that provides the agency administrator the
information needed to approve the plan and the Prescribed Fire Burn
Boss with all the information needed to implement the prescribed
fire.” 189 Because the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide specifically prescribes
a course of action for planning and implementing a prescribed fire, a
federal land agency employee has no rightful choice but to adhere to the
prescribed fire plan.
Therefore, when a federal land agency implements a prescribed fire
and that fire subsequently escapes causing property damage, the federal
district court should (1) conclude the discretionary function exception
does not apply and (2) allow the injured party to proceed to litigate
liability.
6. FTCA Guidance from the Supreme Court
In addition to the current 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide, the U.S.
Supreme Court has also provided specific guidance to lower courts when
evaluating a wildland fire tort claim under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 190 Rayonier v. United States represents the Supreme Court’s first,
and currently only, detailed analysis applying the FTCA to federal
wildland fire issues. 191

186. Id. at 11.
187. Id. at 12.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 19.
190. Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957), on remand, Arnhold v. United States,
284 F.2d 326, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding USFS liable under Washington law for negligently
failing to control a fire started on federal land), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 876 (1961).
191. Anderson v. United States, 55 F.3d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Rayonier, 352 U.S.
at 319–21).
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Rayonier involved damage claims resulting from wildfires ignited
by sparks from a railroad locomotive near Forks, Washington.192 The
plaintiffs claimed the USFS negligently suppressed the wildfires and
negligently maintained the property, and that negligence caused harm to
the plaintiffs. 193 While not explicitly described, the government did not
appear to assert the discretionary function exception, likely because the
USFS had entered into an agreement to suppress fires in the specific area
where the fires occurred. 194 The district court dismissed the claims for
failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, yet the district
court cited a discretionary function exception case for authority. 195 The
Supreme Court, however, vacated and remanded.196 In doing so, the
Court provided plaintiff friendly guidance to the lower courts when
evaluating future wildland fire liability pursuant to the FTCA. 197
In Rayonier, the Court stated “[i]t may be that it is novel and
unprecedented to hold the United States accountable for the negligence
of its fire-fighters, but the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to
waive the Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort
actions and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental
liability.” 198 The Supreme Court also stated that although the potential
damage caused by fires can include burning entire communities and that
may impose great burdens on the public treasury, Congress believed
imposing such liability onto the United States was “in the best interest of
the nation.” 199 The Supreme Court also expressed that it will not read
“exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress,” and “[i]f
192. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 316–17; The Great Forks Fire of 1951, OLYMPIC PENINSULA
CMTY. MUSEUM, http://content.lib.washington.edu/cmpweb/exhibits/forksfire/index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) (describing one of the fires ignited due to a logging train traveling on the Port Angeles and Western Railroad); Karen M. Bradshaw, Backfired! Distorted Incentives in Wildfire Suppression Techniques, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 163 (2011) (mistakenly stating the fire in Rayonier was a prescribed fire when it was actually a wildfire—an unintentional ignition without authority).
193. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 316–17.
194. Arnhold v. United States, 284 F.2d 326, 328 (9th Cir. 1960) (“[I]n this case the United
States had entered into a cooperative agreement, under 16 U.S.C. § 572 and R.C.W. 76.04.400,
whereby the United States had undertaken to protect all non-United States owned land in the region
from fire and to take ‘immediate vigorous action’ to control all fires breaking out in the protected
area.”); Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an Era of Ecology and
Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301, 352 (2006) (stating that the United States, curiously, did not assert the
discretionary function defense in Rayonier).
195. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 317 (stating that the lower courts cited to Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 43 (1953) (dismissing because the alleged government conduct fell within the discretionary function exception)).
196. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 321.
197. Id. at 319–21.
198. Id. at 319.
199. Id. at 319–20.
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the Act is to be altered that is a function for the same body that adopted
it.” 200 Thus, the Supreme Court has expressly provided direction to limit
the application of the Federal Tort Claims Act waiver of sovereign
immunity in the specific context of wildland fire.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act
should only be applied to prescribed fire claims and not to wildfire
claims. Unlike the government’s conduct in response to a wildfire, which
requires a variety of permissive discretionary choices,201 the government
does not have discretion planning or implementing a prescribed fire.
During a wildfire response, the government needs discretion to quickly
evaluate each emergency and determine how to respond. In contrast, the
government is not entitled to that discretion with a prescribed fire
because the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide requires the government to plan
and implement the prescribed fire in accord with the site-specific
prescribed fire plan. 202 Once the government completes a prescribed fire
plan, the only “choice” it has involves whether to implement the
prescribed fire, and that fettered decision is regulated by the prescribed
fire plan. Thus, because the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide specifically
mandates the planning and implementation of a prescribed fire, a federal
land agency does not have discretion to ignore those mandates.
Therefore, consistent with Florida, the Berkovitz test, the 2008
Prescribed Fire Guide, and the policies articulated by the Supreme Court
in Rayonier, the discretionary function exception should not apply to
prescribed fire tort claims. Specifically, under the first prong of the
Berkovitz test, a court analyzes whether the federal land agency’s
conduct in planning and implementing the prescribed fire was a matter of
judgment or choice. Because the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide provides
mandatory directives for planning and implementing a prescribed fire, a
court should conclude the federal land agency employee’s conduct was
not a matter of judgment or choice. Thus, the discretionary function
exception does not apply to prescribed fire tort claims. This analysis
comports with the recent Florida decision and with the limited waiver of
sovereign immunity articulated in Rayonier. Therefore, when a
prescribed fire damage claim is brought against the United States, a
federal land agency should no longer use the discretionary function
exception as a shield.
200. Id. at 320.
201. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 596–97 (9th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing
Rayonier and Anderson regarding the application of the discretionary function exception to wildland
fire claims); Bradshaw, supra note 95, at 457 (concurring that in response to a wildfire “government
agencies must make difficult decisions under exigent circumstances”).
202. See, e.g., Miller, 163 F.3d at 597 (holding the discretionary function exception barred recovery resulting from property damage caused by multiple lightning ignited wildfires).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the recent terminology changes may appear insignificant,
the new terminology and resulting classification scheme will likely
improve the public’s understanding of both wildfires and prescribed
fires. It will also simplify any subsequent litigation under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Because the new terminology clarifies the distinction
between wildfires and prescribed fires, misleading and inaccurate terms
such as “controlled burn,” “prescribed natural fire,” or “natural
prescribed fire” have been shelved. Abandoning those terms will also
enable a court to better understand the classification distinction between
prescribed fires and wildfires. Additionally, the new terminology
describing fires based on the federal land agency’s response will also
benefit the agency when it asserts the discretionary function exception in
response to a wildfire.
Should a federal court consider a discretionary function exception
issue involving a prescribed fire, the federal court should combine the
contextual prescribed fire analysis into the Berkovitz two-pronged test as
the Florida court did. Under the first prong, the court should analyze
whether the employee’s prescribed fire planning and implementation was
a matter of judgment or choice. Because all federal prescribed fires are
strictly regulated by the prescribed fire plan created pursuant to the 2008
Prescribed Fire Guide and because all of the federal land agencies have
adopted and agreed that the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide provides
mandatory direction, the first prong of the Berkovitz test will always be
answered in the negative: prescribed fire planning or implementation is
not discretionary. Thus, a federal land agency employee does not have
the choice whether to follow the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide’s planning
and implementation requirements for any prescribed fire, large or small.
Even if a federal land agency asserts that it had discretion in formulating
the prescribed fire plan, the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide also requires
that the federal land agency employee implement the prescribed fire
pursuant to the prescribed fire plan. Thus, the 2008 Prescribed Fire
Guide erodes any permissive discretion the federal land agencies had in
planning and implementing a prescribed fire. Therefore, the discretionary
function exception should not bar a claim for damages resulting from a
prescribed fire.

